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AVOIDING TAKINGS "ACCIDENTS": 
A TORT PERSPECTIVE ON TAKINGS LAW* 
Eric Kades •• 
ABSTRACT 
Viewing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a 
form of insurance appeals to our intuition. The government, 
like fire, does not often "take" property, but when faced with 
extraordinary risk property owners naturally desire compensa-
tion. Recent scholarship, however, has dissolved the attractive-
ness of this perspective. This literature, through economic anal-
ysis, claims that the Takings Clause should be repealed and 
replaced with private takings insurance. This is the "no-com-
pensation" result. 
This article argues that the insurance-based understanding of 
the just compensation requirement can be preserved without 
reaching the surprising no-compensation result. The intuitive 
appeal of understanding the Takings Clause as a form of insur-
ance is worth preserving, 1 and a compelling constitutional 
foundation exists for this view.2 The Takings Clause is a con-
stitutional bargain rooted in economic logic.3 The no-compensa-
tion result rests on an unbalanced and unrealistic view of the 
relationship between government and property owners, 4 and 
the Takings Clause makes sense once we realize that the gov-
ernment, as well as property owners, must have incentives to 
* Thanks to Professors Carol Rose, Susan Rose-Ackerman and especially Robert 
Ellickson for valuable comments on each and every section of this paper. Thanks to 
my wife Leigh Ann, who gave birth to something much more special than a paper 
with more grace and ease than I could muster in producing this article. 
** Law clerk to the Honorable Morton I. Greenberg, Judge, United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. B.A., 1985, Yale College; J.D., 1994, Yale Law 
School. 
1. See infra notes 18-54 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text. 
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behave efficiently.5 Indeed, because of its monopoly over infor-
mation about possible takings, the government requires special 
impetus to act optimally. 6 Courts, in contrast to no-compensa-
tion scholars, have been sensitive to the need to encourage 
proper state action. 7 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Most homeowners purchase fire insurance because they are 
risk-averse. They could take a chance that they would never 
need coverage and save themselves annual premiums, but the 
small probability of a big disaster justifies the outlay. Although 
the idea is not entirely new, 8 recent scholarship has viewed the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment9 as a form of insur-
ance. In other words, when the government takes land for a 
project/0 it pays the owner for this "disaster." The fact that 
landowners pay no premiums for this insurance, however, rais-
es a problem: if government condemnations are no different 
from lightning, gas leaks, and other "acts of God," landowners 
should weigh the risk of a taking just as they weigh these 
other risks, and should pay premiums so that they internalize 
this cost. 
Such bald economic analysis of a constitutional clause, let 
alone a component of the Bill of Rights, 11 may sound 
strange.12 Indeed, according to common scholarly wisdom, the 
5. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 107-120 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 121-136 and accompanying text. 
8. See, e.g., Stone v. Mayor of New York, 25 Wend. 157, 176-77 (N.Y. 1840). 
As [fire] is a calamity to which all parts of the city may at different 
times be subject, the whole city may fairly be made liable by law to 
contribute whenever it occurs. It is so far a sort of mutual insurance, 
and all property is held subject to that agreement and responsibility, 
with all contingent future benefits of it as well as the burden. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[n]or shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation."). 
10. This article assumes the definition of takings is established, and does not deal 
with the more commonly debated issue of distinguishing (compensable) takings from 
(noncompensable) regulation. 
11. U.S. CONST. amends. I to X. 
12. But cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992) (con-
taining section on "The Constitution and the Federal System," with chapters on "Eco-
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Constitution and economics mix poorly.13 Those elaborating the 
insurance-like characteristics of just compensation feel obliged 
to disclaim any pretension to constitutional interpretation.14 To 
the extent that their normative economic arguments are at odds 
with conventional constitutional theory, they defer to estab-
lished legal wisdom. 
This paper takes issue with both the economic and the 
constitutional conclusions of the "takings insurance"15 litera-
ture. It argues that the raison d'etre for insurance-risk 
aversion-permeates the Fifth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, 
and the Constitution as a whole. Since risk aversion is one of 
the animating principles of the Takings Clause, no need exists 
to forswear legal grounds for the insurance interpretation. How-
ever, past work has failed to consider some important distin-
guishing features of takings insurance: (1) the informational 
advantage of the insurer (the government), and (2) the need to 
encourage both the government and the citizens to minimize 
the number of takings "accidents."16 Neither constitutional nor 
economic scholars have given risk aversion or risk information 
their due in takings law. 
Part II introduces the basic idea of takings insurance, and 
explains why, given some implausible assumptions on the na-
ture of government, the insurance approach suggests that the 
government shoUld never compensate property owners for con-
demnations. 
Part III provides a constitutional foundation for reading the 
Takings Clause (along with most of the Bill of Rights, and the 
Constitution as a whole) through the lens of risk aversion and 
nomic Due Process" and "The Economics of Federalism"). 
13. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1134 (1993) ("The con-
stitutional right to compensation, to be a constitutional right, must stand precisely 
when the felicific or economic calculus would count against it.") (emphasis added). 
14. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 571 (1984) (addressing "neither the history [nor 
the] current state of takings jurisprudence"); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, 
Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just 
Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269 (1988) ("[T]he explicit command of 
the Fifth Amendment does not foreclose asking whether, on balance, this rule is a 
good thing."). 
15. See infra part II. 
16. See infra part W. 
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the directly related idea of insurance. A novel explanation is 
then offered, based on this constitutional principle of risk aver-
sion, to avoid the "holdout" problem in eminent domain cases. 
As a prelude to the next section, Part III concludes by arguing 
that the Constitution presumes that elected governments, like 
any other type of agent, should not be expected to act faithfully 
and carefully without incentives and monitoring. 
Part IV builds on this view of government through an analo-
gy of takings to accidents. Although this comparison may strike 
readers as implausible, this section argues that just as tort law 
aims to provide incentives for the lowest cost avoidance of acci-
dents, 17 takings law should aim to provide incentives for both 
landowners and the government to minimize social loss fi.·om 
condemnations. 
Part V scrutinizes the central role played by information in 
takings. Viewed as insurance, takings present an unusual situa-
tion. The government (the insurer) possesses much more infor-
mation about prospective risks than the insured (landowners). 
This implies that often the government is in the best position 
to avoid wasteful development of land that will probably be 
condemned in the future. 
Finally, Part VI examines how courts have dealt with takings 
accidents. Unlike academia, the courts have been sensitive 
both to the ability of government to warn landowners through 
the early release of information, and to the ability of landown-
ers to avoid wasteful development in the face of probable con-
demnation. The courts tend to award compensation in the for-
mer cases, but not in the latter. 
II. TAKINGS INSURANCE: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
A. Just Compensation as Insurance 
In deciding whether to insure against a risk, there are two 
key questions: 
(1) How frequently does the risk result in losses? 
17. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY· 
SIS (1970). 
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(2) How large are the losses likely to be? 
Insurance makes the most sense for large but infrequent losses, 
such as fires. For a modest annual premium, homeowners and 
businesses protect themselves against the loss of a major asset. 
Owners effectively diversify away the risk of fires, paying ins~­
ance companies a premium over actuarially fair insurance be-
cause they are risk-averse.18 
Large and frequent losses are simply uninsurable. Even by 
pooling resources through insurance, property owners will be 
unable to cover the costs of too many disasters. Fortunately, we 
do not often face such risks. To take a real world example, 
airlines and shippers are often unable to obtain insurance when 
operating in war zones.19 Also, citizens of Bosnia probably can-
not obtain any type of property insurance due to the war. While 
it might appear that health insurance guards against large and 
frequent risks, this mischaracterizes the nature of medical out-
lays.20 
Contracting costs generally make it economically infeasible to 
insure against small losses. If such small losses are frequent, 
18. For a concise explanation of the economic motivation for insurance purchases, 
see WALTER NICHOlSON, MlCROECONOl>fiC THEORY 205-07 (3d ed. 1985). 
19. See Stuart Diamond, Oil Companies Caution Ships in Persian Gulf, N.Y. 
TIMEs, May 18, 1984, at A4 (finding that shipping insurance rates tripled as a result 
of the Iran-Iraq war, and citing oil official for the proposition that "[t]here is a point 
where it becomes uneconomic"); Alan Philps, Carrington Tries to Revive Peace Talks, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 2, 1992, at 8 (reporting that "no commercial aircraft; can be 
insured to fly" over disputed airspace in former Yugoslavia); David Wickers, Gulf 
Crisis, SUNDAY TIMEs OF LoNDON, Jan. 13, 1991, Features Section (warning that 
"there could be a complete withdrawal of [insurance coverage] for flights to areas 
near the Gulf' in the face of the campaign against Iraq). 
20. Health insurance in America today contains relatively small deductibles, and 
the average person depends on health "insurance" to pay most of the expected medical 
outlays each year. Thus, health insurance is an indirect form of cash income, not a 
way to diversify risk. Arguably, the single largest problem with health insurance 
today is that payment of virtually all costs via insurance creates few incentives for 
consumers to economize on their use of medical services, or to search for bargains to 
drive down costs. A more sensible form of health insurance would contain a deduct-
ible equal to average annual outlays, and would cover only extraordinary and unex-
pected medical costs. A central tension in accident law is illustrated by the excessive 
spreading of costs, via insurance or similar schemes. This spreading of costs removes 
incentives to avoid costs. CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 68-134. This tension is the 
basis for the strongest theoretical objection to just compensation. See infra part ll.B. 
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there is no way to diversify through insurance. Conversely, it is 
not worth the trouble to insure against small, infrequent losses. 
Table r 1 below, applies this analysis to takings insurance. 
Obviously, both dimensions (frequency of loss and size of loss) 
are in practice continuously. Two categories are presented in 
order to highlight the key insights of the model. The model 
covers a complication not present in traditional casualty insur-
ance. The difference is that takings accidents, unlike fires, 
typically benefit the community at large. 
Table I 
Loss Frequency, Size, and Implications for Takings Insurance 
I FREQUENT I INFREQUENT I 
uninsurable; hopefiiUy like house fires; al-
BIG unusual ways compensate, paradigmatic case 
for risk-averse own-
ers to insure 
SMALL never compensate, never compensate, 
reciprocal benefits to like deductible in 
all over the long run casualty insurance 
policies 
Takings analysis mirrors that of fire insurance. Since the 
government could be the cause of a major disaster, the just 
compensation requirement of the Takings Clause provides a 
form of insurance against this type of accident. We can imagine 
that the government funds this premium out of the gains to 
society at large from the project.22 
In addition to the transaction costs barrier, the minimal 
benefits to society as a whole provide additional reasons for not 
21. The table and model are creations of the author. 
22. As the next section discusses, the thrust of previous research in this area is 
that such free insurance creates incentives for economically infeasible development. 
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compensating the victims of smaller takings accidents. Consider, 
for example, the small but frequent inconvenience of traffic 
delays due to road construction.23 In addition to the prohibitive 
costs of compensating every delayed motorist, the government 
can quite plausibly argue that the motorists will be compensat-
ed in the future with better roads and less congestion. As mo-
torists make numerous trips, the costs and benefits of road 
construction are effectively spread evenly over the entire 
driving public. 24 This rough and ready form of compensation is 
automatic and costless. Courts have long recognized the role 
reciprocal benefits play in takings law.25 
Small and infrequent losses due to takings resemble fixed 
deductibles in casualty insurance policies. Based on both the 
transaction costs and the need to create incentives for the in-
sured to avoid losses, it is economically infeasible to insure 
against minor risks. Here the landowner does not expect any 
reciprocal benefit, but must absorb a small loss. This situation 
is similar to that of an insured motorist paying for small re-
pairs necessary after a "fender-bender." This theory suggests 
that the Supreme Court's strict requirement of compensation for 
even the most trivial physical intrusions is misguided. 26 
This simple insurance model based on the Takings Clause 
thus justifies one interpretation of the "diminution test" set 
forth in the seminal case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.27 
The "diminution test" indicates that the government may take 
23. Here the government is taking people's time and time is money. 
24. For the seminal work on how benefits may even out over time, see A. Mitch-
ell Polinsky, Probabalistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. ECON. 407 (1972); see also 
Anthony Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
227, 236-37 (1980); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficien-
cy Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 491-93 (1980). 
25. See Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349, 351-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (per curi-
am) ("The power [to regulate property] rests on the implied right and duty of the 
supreme power to protect all by statutory regulations, so that, on the whole, the bene-
fit of all is promoted."} (emphasis added); see also Colorado Springs Prod. Credit Ass'n 
v. Farm Credit Admin., 967 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that benefits of an 
agricultural program provided reciprocal benefits offsetting requirement that members 
provide additional capital). 
26. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) 
(requiring cable TV company to compensate building owner for installing small boxes 
and a few feet of wire on premises). 
27. 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
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small pieces of a landowner's property without compensation, 
but "[w]hen it reaches a certain magnitude ... there must 
be . . . compensation. "28 
B. The Problem With Takings Insurance and the 
"No-Compensation" Result 
There is one critical difference between just compensation 
under the Takings Clause (referred to as "takings insurance" in 
this paper) and run-of-the-mill casualty insurance. Unlike casu-
alty insurance, landowners pay no premiums in return for their 
coverage under "takings insurance. "29 The constitutional re-
quirement of just compensation does not include an antecedent 
schedule of charges assessed to landowners. Landowners take 
advantage of this benefit like any other free good or service. 
The downside and the end result is that the taxpaying public 
subsidizes inefficient private development. 30 
The following example illustrates the problem with free in-
surance. The landowner has two options in developing land: (1) 
build a cattle barn, or (2) use the land for raising corn. Light-
ning poses no threat to the corn crop, and the yield is a sum 
certain of $100. Milking cattle would yield $110 if lightning 
does not strike the barn. If lightening did strike, the barn and 
cattle would be destroyed, leaving the dairy farmer with noth-
ing. If there is a ten percent chance that lightning will strike, 
the expected value of the cattle investment is only $99.31 In 
the absence of insurance, or if the premium on private insur-
ance exceeded $1, the landowner would choose to plant corn 
and receive $100. This is true even if the landowner is not risk-
averse. If the land owner is risk-averse, the certain return to 
28. Id. at 413 (J. Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court). 
29. Although it might be argued that property taxes include an implicit premium 
payment for takings insurance, this tax is not tied at all to the probability of con-
demnation, whereas efficiently priced takings insurance would be. This article con-
tends that landowners in effect do pay premiums for takings insurance by granting 
government the power to condemn property in the first place. See infra part ill.B.l. 
30. See Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Slwuld Compensation 
Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984). 
31. The expected value calculation is: (90% chance of earning $110) (10% chance 
of earning nothing) = (0.9 * $110) (0.1 * 0) = $99 $0 = $99. 
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planting corn becomes even more attractive relative to the risky 
returns of dairy farming.32 
Assume the government provides free insurance against light-
ning damage. If the landowner erects the barn, invests in cattle 
and then lightning strikes, the government would pay the land-
owner $110. This amount equals the full yield if all had gone 
well.33 This insurance will induce the landowner to invest in 
cattle instead of corn, since the extra $10 is certain. But from 
society's point of view, this is inefficient. Consider the larger 
picture, where there are one hundred such farmers. Following 
the logic above, each will become a dairy farmer. It is statisti-
cally likely that lightning will destroy ten of these operations. 
Thus, as a group, landowners create $9900 of wealth. In the 
absence of free lightning insurance, all one hundred would have 
reaped $100 worth of corn, producing $10,000 of wealth. 
As a result, free lightning insurance would cost society $100 
by shaping landowners' development incentives. Now rewrite 
the example and replace "lightning" with "government condem-
nation."34 In this simple model of the world, the just compen-
sation requirement of the Fifth Amendment would force the 
government to provide socially undesirable free insurance cover-
age to every landowner.35 According to this scenario, just com-
32. Succinctly defined, "[a]n individual who always refuses fair bets is said to be 
risk-averse;" Thus, such individuals "will be willing to pay something to avoid taking 
fair bets." NICHOLSON, supra note 18, at 205. For example, a risk-averse individual 
would not pay $50 for a 50% chance of receiving $100 coupled with a 50% chance of 
obtaining nothing. In addition, a risk-averse individual would pay some positive 
amount to avoid the risk of having such a choice forced upon her. See infra part ill 
(discussing the prominent role that risk aversion plays in the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution as a whole). · 
33. The analysis still holds if the government insures only the original investment 
of $100. 
34. Comparing government action with acts of God like lightning seems mis-
guided. A major theme of this paper is that minimizing the cost of takings requires 
proper incentives for government actors as well as private landowners. See infra part 
IV. 
35. Two of the contributors to this insight, however, considerably circumscribed its 
implications to the real world. Blume and Rubinfeld conclude that a number of pecu-
liarities lead to a failure in the private market for insurance to protect landowners 
from regulations deemed by the courts to require no compensation. They conclude 
that the government should provide compensation for private landowners when the 
landowners would have purchased the insurance themselves had it existed. By assum-
ing that owners are risk-averse, and that money has decreasing utility, Blume and 
Rubinfeld advocate a modified form of the Mahon diminution test that favors land· 
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pensation spreads risk too well and ignores the need to deter 
wasteful development. 36 
Louis Kaplow has provided a powerful generalization of this 
"no-compensation" logic.37 Building on the supposition that "un-
certainty concerning government policy is analytically equiva-
lent to general market uncertainty,"38 Kaplow argues that the 
state should not offer compensation for any shifts in the legal 
regime, be it condemnation of land, or changes in the tax 
code. 39 Private insurance, when economically sensible, provides 
the means to guard against fire and other similar risks.40 By 
analogy, private takings insurance would be created if eminent 
domain became an insurable risk. If we accept the analogy be-
tween risks from government activity and other sources of risk, 
Kaplow's argument is compelling. 
He argues convincingly that little reason exists to believe 
that there is a form of market failure inhibiting private takings 
insurance. Kaplow's discussion serves as a useful ini..Toduction 
to some important insurance issues that arise later in this 
owners of modest wealth. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 14. 
However, according to one empirical study, our present eminent domain system 
does not work this way. See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Do-
main, 84 J. PoL. ECON. 473 (1976) (finding that high-priced properties receive com-
pensation in excess of market value, while low-priced properties receive compensation 
below market value). 
What if the government weighs the value of e.Xisting development in deciding 
which projects are worthwhile? In this case, landowners may consciously alter their 
development plans to discourage condemnation. This is demonstrated formally in 
Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under Eminent Domain, 147 
J. lNST. & THEOR. ECON. 354 (1991); see also Jack L. Knetsch & Thomas E. 
Borcherding, Expropriation of Priuate Property and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 237, 243 (1979) ("A further ... inefficiency induced by the restriction 
of awards to market value is the incentive that this provides to use resources in at-
tempting to alter expropriation decisions."). 
On a deeper level, of course, the government might realize that some landown-
ers were trying to manipulate the system and attempt to find a method of discerning 
such machinations. This seems to degenerate into an infinite cycle of attempting to 
anticipate the reaction of the other side. 
36. See supra note 20. 
37. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 
509 (1986). 
38. Id. at 520. Kaplow devotes an entire section to this proposition, titled wrhe 
Similarity of Government- and Market-Created Risks." Id. at 533-37. 
39. Id. at 567. 
40. Id. at 528, 533-34. 
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article.41 More specifically, Kaplow discusses the four main 
causes of insurance market failure: (1) moral hazard, (2) ad-
verse selection, (3) transaction costs, and (4) access to mar-
kets.42 This article will focus on the first two causes men-
tioned, moral hazard and adverse selection.43 
Moral hazard is the lack of incentives for an insured to mini-
mize losses because of insurance coverage.44 For example, a 
homeowner with fire insurance may neglect cost-effective pre-
ventive measures, such as installing smoke alarms and keeping 
a fire extinguisher in the kitchen, because she receives no bene-
fit from these out-of-pocket expenses. 
Insurers guard against moral hazard in two ways. First, they 
may contractually require insured parties to take precautions 
such as installing smoke detectors. However, insurers may have 
to monitor compliance with these terms, and this "monitoring" 
could be expensive. A second solution is to provide only partial 
coverage. 45 Kaplow finds no reason why landowners and insur-
ers could not use these tools to solve the moral hazard prob-
lems surrounding takings insurance.46 For example, if insur-
ance companies feared that insured landowners would further 
develop their land unwisely in the face of a possible taking, 
then they could write policies covering only a fixed amount and 
excluding any subsequent improvements. This limited policy 
would impose the residual risk of a taking on the landowner 
and shield the insurance company from unexpected losses. 
41. See infra part V. 
42. Kaplow, supra note 37, at 536. 
43. For a discussion of the role of transaction costs in a takings insurance mar-
ket, see id. at 545-48 (noting that low frequency of takings makes insurance expen-
sive, but that the large potential losses make it attractive). For Kaplow's discussion 
of "access to markets," see id. at 548-50 (discussing limited knowledge and limited ac-
cess to insurance, and concluding that even if these lead to market failure, the gov-
ernment should charge for insurance instead of compensating). 
44. Id. at 537. 
45. Id. at 538. There are three common ways of providing only partial coverage. 
First, many insurance policies include a deductible, an amount the insured must 
absorb before insurance coverage applies. Second, co-insurance makes the insurer 
responsible for only a partial percent of any losses, thereby making the insured party, 
in effect, a co-insurer. Finally, the policy may have a cap, a maximum amount pay-
able regardless of the size of the loss. Many casualty policies combine two or three of 
these types of partial coverage. See RoBERT I. MEHR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSUR-
ANCE 199, 218-20, 222 (8th ed. 1985). 
46. Kaplow, supra note 37, at 538. 
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While differences in information between insurers and the 
insured may play a role in moral hazard, these differences are 
the chief problem in adverse selection. 47 For example, assume 
that there are two equal-sized groups of auto collision insurance 
buyers whose labels, offenders and defenders, describe their 
driving styles. The offenders are involved in many more acci-
dents and their average cost of insurance is $900 a year. De-
fenders, on the other hand, cost an average of only $100 a year 
to insure. The problem is that no economical way exists for 
insurers to identify the driving styles of their customers and 
charge them accordingly. Each driver, however, is aware of 
his/her own driving style. 
Since insurers are unable to divide drivers into two risk 
pools, they will charge all drivers $500 which is the average 
cost of accidents.48 This rate will be extremely attractive to 
offenders, who will jump at the bargain, but the same rate will 
appear unfair to defenders, who may choose to self-insure. The 
resulting group covered by the insurance company will include 
a larger group of offenders; therefore, the insurance company 
will ultimately incur losses. When insurers are leery of this 
process of adverse selection (i.e., when insured pariies have 
much better knowledge of their own risk category than the 
insurer can economically obtain), they will refrain from writing 
insurance and thereby create market failure. 49 
Although Kaplow does not rule out adverse selection in a 
private takings insurance market, 50 he notes: 
Similar arguments can be made for most of the currently 
insured risks to property [e.g., fire insurance], where the 
problem has not been sufficient to undermine insurance. 
Moreover, the argument [that adverse selection would un-
dermine a private takings insurance market] assumes that 
homeowners would in fact have sufficient information con-
cerning the degree to which the risk to their own property 
differs from the average. 61 
47. Id. at 543. 
48. The example ignores transaction costs; this is actuarially fair insurance. See 
supra note 18. 
49. See Kaplow, supra note 37, at 543-44. 
50. "Ultimately, these are empirical questions that require further study." Id. at 
544 n.97. 
51. Id. at 544. Kaplow's failure to notice the obvious informational advantage held 
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Since Kaplow believes that private insurance would eliminate 
the inefficiencies caused by free governmE:mt compensation, he 
provides economic ammunition for amending the Constitution 
and deleting the Takings Clause. This is part of his larger 
thesis that the government should not compensate the losers in 
legal transitions. 52 This thesis is based on his analogy between 
the risks of legal change and all other (uncompensated) sources 
of risk. Kaplow does hedge in applying his general theory to 
takings, noting that some "institutional considerations," "con-
cerns about abuse of power," or "holdout problems" may justify 
government compensation.63 However, his bottom line is that 
"[a]rguments relating to investment incentives and allocation of 
risk . . . are highly suspect. "54 
ill. RisK AVERSION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE 
Part IV will directly confront Kaplow's contention that just 
compensation is inconsistent with (efficient) "investment incen-
. tives and allocation of risk. "55 Before reaching that issue, how-
ever, this section disposes of three antecedent issues: (A) strong 
textual support exists, based on the primacy of risk aversion in 
the Bill of Rights, for the insurance paradigm of the Takings 
Clause, (B) the Takings Clause makes sense as an ex ante bar-
gain between risk-averse landowners and their government to 
avoid the holdout problem, and (C) risk aversion permeates the 
Constitution as a whole, bringing into question assumptions 
about the nature of government that are implicit in the no-
compensation result. 
A. Textual Foundations: The Bill of Rights and Beyond 
Some scholars have dismissed the entire insurance modeling 
enterprise, summarized in part II of this article discussing the 
economic foundations of takings insurance. These scholars argue 
by the government in takings is considered at length in part V of this article. 
52. Id. at 570. 
53. Id. at 603-05 & n.300. 
54. Id. at 605. 
55. Id. at 527-32. 
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that the Takings Clause creates a political right not subject to 
economic analysis.66 This argument ignores the fact that the 
clause is about trading land for money, a paradigmatically 
economic issue. Moreover, reading the Takings Clause in the 
context of the Fifth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the rest 
of the Constitution reveals the consistent theme of risk aver-
sion. Risk aversion constitutes the primary motivation for buy-
ing insurance. 
Look closely at the Fifth Amendment. In addition to the 
Takings Clause, it contains the Grand Jury Clause, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, the Self Incrimination Clause, and the Due 
Process Clause. In a sense, all of these clauses fall under the 
due process rubric. More specifically, they prescribe or proscribe 
legal procedures, not substantive rights. Furthermore, risk aver-
sion is at the heart of due process. 
Summary ("undue") proceedings would be much less expen-
sive than the full panoply of procedural safeguards provided 
under the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, these proceedings 
would probably suffice to accurately determine the majority of 
cases that are relatively simple. 57 But in criminal cases and 
when significant property interests are at stake, the cost of 
accidental error looms large. The old maxim, that it is better to 
set ten guilty men free than to imprison one innocent man, 
summarizes the appeal of due process. Each citizen is a poten-
tial victim of an erroneous conviction or civil judgment. Conse-
quently, he or she should willingly pay for extra procedural 
protections. Under the Constitution, Americans pay annual 
premiums (taxes funding a judicial system providing due pro-
cess) to insure against prosecuting the innocent. 
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment performs an 
initial screening function that prevents one person (the prosecu-
tor) from pursuing a case without some showing of probable 
cause.58 The term "probable" demonstrates that the main 
56. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 13. 
57. For a basic economic analysis of due process, see Richard A. Posner, An Ecrr 
nomic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
399 (1973). 
58. "Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the 
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution .... " Wood v. Georgia, 
370 u.s. 375, 390 (1962). 
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thrust of this procedural requirement is derailing the persecu-
tion of innocent persons. By requiring the prosecutor to obtain 
the assent of a majority of the grand jurors, the clause elimi-
nates the risk that a lone prosecutor may be motivated by per-
sonal animus, political grounds, or stupidity. 
Juries, perhaps the single most prominent subject in the Bill 
of Rights, 59 demonstrate the role of risk aversion in the Bill of 
Rights outside of the Fifth Amendment. The criminal and civil 
petit juries required by the Sixth and Seventh Amendments 
serve a screening function similar to grand juries, and they 
eliminate the risk that a single person, acting as a judge, will 
incorrectly decide a case. The traditional unanimity requirement 
for criminal juries60 further demonstrates that the Bill of 
Rights evinces a strong aversion to verdicts against the inno-
cent. 
The other criminal procedural protections of the Sixth 
Amendment are consistent with this reading. Despite the cost, 
the right "to be confronted with" prosecution witnesses and to 
compel the appearance of other witnesses insures that the de-
fendant may present to the jury any testimony that might raise 
a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt. Finally, the right "to 
have the assistance of counsel" is intended to provide defen-
dants with effective counsel to argue their case. 
The Eighth Amendment's ban on "excessive fines" and "cruel 
and unusual punishment" limits the punishment that the state 
can inflict on the guilty. These precautions reveal that risk 
aversion functions at a more fundamental level than simply 
avoiding erroneous convictions. The most upstanding citizen, if 
risk-averse, will want to place some punishments beyond the 
pale of the law. Even if an individual is certain that he or she 
will never break the law, there are two reasons to support the 
Eighth Amendment. First, an individual might fall victim to an 
59. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1190 (1991) ("'f we seek a paradigmatic image underlying the Bill of Rights, we can-
not go far wrong in picking the jury."). 
60. The Supreme Court has carefully limited the scope of slight deviations from 
the unanimity requirement for criminal jury convictions. Lee Burch v. Louisiana, 441 
U.S. 130, 134 (1979) (mandating unanimity for conviction by six person jury). But see 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) (allowing convictions based on votes of 
11-1 and 10-2 on twelve person juries). 
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erroneous conviction despite the procedural requirements dis-
cussed above. Second, family or friends may violate the law, 
causing vicarious suffering resulting from ruinous fines or bru-
tal retribution. 
Finally, consider the Fourth Amendment's strong restraints 
on searches and seizures. 61 Law enforcement officials could 
undoubtedly catch and convict more criminals without this 
constraint on their investigations. However, under the logic of 
the Fourth Amendment, the risk, albeit a smaller one, that 
state officials will trample the rights of the innocent is so egre-
gious that society forgoes the "efficiency" of more convictions to 
minimize such intrusions. 
Risk aversion animates five of the eight "nonstructural"62 
provisions of the Bill of Rights and generally implies the desire 
for insurance. Thus, the takings insurance approach rests on a 
solid textual foundation. To the extent that takings insurance 
appeals to risk aversion, economic analysis of the Takings 
Clause, and indeed the remainder of the Constitution, 63 need 
not be prefaced with an apology. After all, this interpretation of 
the Takings Clause evidences a central theme in the docu-
ment.64 
B. Risk Aversion, Options, and the Holdout Problem 
This textual exegesis is only the beginning of the story. This 
section explains why, based on the constitutionally central idea 
of risk aversion, landowners might sacrifice the greater safety 
61. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence obtained in 
unreasonable searches and seizures). 
62. The "structural" Ninth and Tenth Amendments address broader themes of 
popular sovereignty and federalism. See infra part ill.C (discussing structural 
themes). 
63. See infra part III.C.l. 
64. One historical study suggests that the liberalism implicit in protecting individ-
ual property interests was a recent innovation at the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985) (implau-
sibly suggesting that the populace converted from self-sacrificing civic republicans to 
self-serving, individualistic liberals in the span of about thirteen years (from 1776 to 
1789)). For a more sophisticated and believable analysis of the tension between these 
two traditions in takings law, see Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Tak-
ings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984). 
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of absolute property rights and willingly cede their government 
eminent domain power. The first argument is that just compen-
sation is not free insurance, since the Takings Clause compro-
mises an absolute property regime via the government's option 
to purchase and creates instead a liability regime.65 Property 
rights are an important norm in the Constitution, seemingly 
motivated by risk aversion. Hence, just compensation is the 
quid pro quo for this reduction in ownership rights, and is not 
a proverbial free lunch. Moreover, it is argued this ex ante 
constitutional bargain makes economic sense. After explaining 
the options and recasting the government's condemnation power 
in terms of such options, a novel economic justification is of-
fered for adopting a liability regime. This justification uses 
these options to explain why risk-averse landowners resort to 
the liability regime to solve the holdout problem. 
1. A Constitutional Bargain 
The Founders placed great weight on the importance of pri-
vate property,66 motivated in large part by the sort of risk 
aversion behind federalism and separation of powers. James 
Madison, the author of the Takings Clause, argued that 
"[g]overnment is instituted no less for protection of the proper-
ty, than of the persons, of individuals."67 The famous historian 
Charles Beard revolutionized perceptions of the Founders by 
exposing the primacy of economic interests in shaping the Con-
65. The terms "property rule" and "liability rule," from Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamud, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One Vrew of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), are defined later in the text. See infra note 
75 and accompanying text. 
66. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 29 (1985) ("'t is very clear that the founders 
shared Locke's and Blackstone's affection for private property, which is why they 
inserted the eminent domain provision in the Bill of Rights."). Epstein does not suffi-
ciently explain, however, why the Founders did not create an absolute property rule. 
See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRivATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1977) 
("There can be little doubt that the Framers thought the protection of property rights 
a very important thing indeed, and that a reading of the Constitution which would 
render the compensation clause a dead letter would be contrary to their intentions.") 
(citation omitted). Ackerman's observation clearly poses a legal problem for the no-
compensation theorists to the extent that the intention of the Founders controls con-
struction of the Constitution. 
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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stitution. 68 Other scholars have emphasized that property stood 
for more than just economic self-interest.69 
Does the Takings Clause mock its own use of the phrase 
"private property"? Under a full-bodied property rule, landown-
ers could negotiate with the government whenever it wanted 
their property, and they could hold out for the highest price 
that the state was willing to pay. The Takings Clause, however, 
involves a serious incursion into the nature of private property 
rights. The government can take land whenever it wishes, and 
in return pay only a predetermined level of just compensation. 
It is unlikely that the Founders would have compromised 
their deep-seated belief in property rights without good reason. 
Their norm was full-bodied property rights, not diluted with 
governmental power to dispossess citizens of the source of their 
independence. The next subsection explains the holdout problem 
that may have motivated the insertion of the Takings Clause 
into the Bill of Rights. But whatever the reason, eminent do-
main was a departure from the standard view of property 
rights and their importance. 70 
Viewed in this light, just compensation offsets, to some ex-
tent, the general decrease in property values caused by the 
government's raw power to condemn. Under this view, just com-
pensation is not free insurance. Instead, it is one side of an ex 
ante bargain between citizens and their government and the 
price the government pays for eroding the property rights norm 
of the Constitution. 71 
68. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1935). 
69. See, e.g., GoRDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBIJC 344-
89 (1969). 
70. Just compensation had only weak roots in Great Britain, and uncompensated 
takings were common in the Colonies. Treanor, supra note 64; FRED P. BOSSEillfAN 
ET AL., COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE TAKING IssUE 82-104 (1973). 
71. For a different interpretation of the motivations for the ex ante bargain em-
bodied in the Takings Clause, see Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just 
Compensation, 12 lNT'L REv. L. & ECON. 125 (1992) (arguing that just compensation 
is a general mechanism to diffuse opposition to socially worthwhile projects). 
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2. Risk Aversion, Options, and the Holdout Problem 
Does this ex ante constitutional bargain make any economic 
sense? This section, building on the idea of the power to con-
demn as an option, argues that the Takings Clause is a ratio-
nal response by risk-averse landowners to the holdout problem. 
a. Options and Liability Rules in a NutshelF2 
The holder of an option has the right to buy or sell a good 
under certain conditions. The most common type of options are 
on stocks and give owners the right to buy or sell shares at a 
fixed price (the "strike" price) for a fixed time period (the 
"term"). The right to buy shares is a call; the right to sell is a 
put.7s 
The government's right to take land is a type of call op-
tion.74 Unlike conventional stock options, the term of the 
government's option is infinite. Moreover, the strike price is not 
72. Options have appeared at least twice before in the takings literature. In 
contrast to the descriptive use in this article, these earlier works made normative 
proposals for using options to improve eminent domain. Both proposals, however, have 
deep theoretical flaws. 
Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 274, propose that the government 
purchase options as far in advance as possible to avoid controversies over 
development in the face of a probable taking. Landowners, however, will negotiate 
over the strike price of the option, once it has developed, as vigorously as they would 
negotiate over just compensation. Using options as a preliminary step to 
condemnation merely pushes all the same problems back one step. 
A more radical proposal aims to solve the takings problem by tying it to 
property tax assessments. Peter F. Colwell, Privatization of Assessment, Zoning, and 
Eminent Domain, ORER LET:r:ER (Office of Real Estate Research, University of Dlinois 
at Urbana-Champaign), Spring 1990, at 1. Colwell proposes that landowners assess 
their own property for tax and condemnation purposes. He would grant anyone the 
option to buy the property at the self-assessed value. Id. at 2. This, he assumes, 
would discourage underassessment as a tax dodge. It is not at all clear, however, 
that the incentive to underassess for tax purposes is precisely counterbalanced by the 
desire to avoid a forced purchase. Indeed, fear of losing one's home might force some 
landowners in Colwell's scheme to over assess the value of their homes. 
73. See JOHN C. COX & MARK RUBINSTEIN, 0Pl'IONS MARKETs 39-44 (1985). 
74. Landowners have a symmetric put option against the government under cer-
tain conditions. If the government imposes excessive burdens on a landowner without 
exercising its eminent domain power, the landowner may file an inverse condemna-
tion suit against the government, asking a court to force the government to condemn 
the property and pay just compensation. 
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fixed; instead, it floats at a level equal to the current market 
value of each property. 
The government's takings option means that owners do not 
hold their land by an absolute property rule, since they cannot 
hold out for a particular price or refuse to sell completely. In-
stead, landowners are protected by a liability rule which re-
quires the government to provide just compensation when land 
is expropriated. 76 An asset held under a liability rule is gener-
ally worth less than if held under a property rule, since the 
owner cannot exploit any bargaining advantage. In other words, 
the owner cannot hold out for the full surplus created by the 
planned project. 
b. Why a Liability Rule Makes Economic Sense 
Does the government's unusual option make any sense? If 
takings law is pervasively inefficient, 76 we might expect that 
there would have been pressure to remove the Takings Clause 
from the Constitution. But apparently there has never been 
even a proposal to amend the Takings Clause. 77 Why? 
The traditional explanation is the holdout problem. This 
problem is exemplified by a citizen holding a plot of land essen-
tial to a public project (e.g., a mountain pass necessary for a 
road) and demanding (holding out for) a price so high that it 
would consume virtually all the gains that the project offered to 
society.78 The discussion below presents this justification in a 
new light. The emphasis is on risk aversion and on the value 
75. See Calabresi & Malamud, supra note 65. See Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 
14, at 275 (applying this distinction to eminent domain). I am unaware of any previ-
ous work noting that options in general convert property rights into liability rights. 
76. See supra part II.B. 
77. The most comprehensive list of proposed constitutional amendments to date 
contains no trace of any efforts to amend the Takings Clause. Michael S. Paulsen, A 
General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amend-
ment, 103 YALE. L.J. 677, app. at 764-89 (1993). 
78. For a vivid historical example of the holdout problem, see Jean-Laurent 
Rosenthal, The Development of Irrigation in Provence, 1700-1860: The French Revo-
lution and Economic Growth, 50 J. ECON. HlsT. 615 (1990). The Old Regime failed to 
develop a number of proposed irrigation projects because of ineffective condemnation 
authority. Any one of a number of groups could hold out, thus transaction costs were 
prohibitive. Reforms enacted during the French Revolution reduced these costs, and 
Republican governments built a number of highly successful irrigation systems. Id. 
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and dispersion of information, concepts considered in greater 
detail in part V. 
To set up the argument, we need to ask why options are 
valuable. For everyday stock options with a fixed strike price 
and term, the value of an option stems largely from the 
chances that the price of the underlying shares will rise. For 
example, a three-month option to buy IBM at $110 a share 
might seem worthless when IBM shares are trading at $100. 
But this ignores the chance that prices will rise above $110 
during the three-month term of the option. If they do, the op-
tion will be worth the difference between the market price and 
the strike price of $110.79 
Under traditional option pricing theory, a "floating" option to 
buy IBM stock at the market price would seem to be worthless. 
The strike price tracks the market price. Therefore, market 
fluctuations cannot place the option "in the money." But option 
pricing models do not account for another source of value. 
Imagine a stock market where everybody had a floating option 
to buy as many shares as they wanted at the current market 
price. A buyer with a better way to deploy IBM assets could 
instantly seize the company. By: using floating options, the 
buyer might be able to avert paying any premium over the 
value attached to the current use of the assets. Thus, all the 
gains from any implementation of innovative plans would be 
captured. 
79. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (authoritative work on option pricing). The 
major omission from the short introduction to options in the text is that higher vola-
tility in the price of the underlying asset increases the value of options on it. To see 
why this is so, observe that the purchaser of a call option can lose no more than her 
purchase price; downward price movements do not impose additional losses. On the 
other hand, she has unlimited upside potential, realizing the full value of all price 
increases above the option's strike price. Higher volatility means both more price 
increases and more price decreases. Since the price increases enhance the value of 
the option while the decreases do not decrease its value, volatility alone increases the 
price of options. 
At first blush, this observation seems to raise a concern. To make its taking 
option more valuable, the government might have incentives to manipulate the land 
market and increase the volatility in the price of land. As discussed in the previous 
paragraph, however, the value of the government's taking option does not come from 
the chance of price increases, and thus, increased volatility will not increase the val-
ue of an option with a floating strike price. 
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Instead, under our existing property rule for share ownership, 
the buyer would have to proceed by purchasing shares on the 
open market. As a result, each share bought would drive up 
prices. Thus, under our present property rules for stock owner-
ship, those with better ideas must share the gains with the 
existing owners.80 Risk aversion explains why shareholders do 
not come together and exchange takings-like floating options 
with each other, thereby creating a liability rule for share own-
ership. With property rights, gains from new ideas about asset 
use are more widely distributed; they would be concentrated if 
stock could be purchased by a takings-like option at the market 
price. 
Eminent domain reverses this reasoning and justifies a liabil-
ity rule for private property. When individuals possess assets 
that the government can put to a higher value use, they may 
be able to capture all of the gain if they control the assets by a 
full property rule. This ability to hold out would lead to concen-
trating the benefits of new projects. Ex ante (constitutionally), it 
is rational for risk-averse owners to accede the power of emi-
nent domain to the government because they trade the poten-
tial windfall for a more certain stream of small gains from each 
project. 
C. The Nature of Government 
The no-compensation theorists81 argue that this constitution-
al bargain is inefficient and should be abandoned in favor of a 
system permitting the government to seize property, thereby 
leaving each landowner to decide whether or not to purchase 
(private) insurance against takings. Their implicit answer to the 
argument of the previous section emphasizes that any gains, 
from avoiding the holdout problem and spreading gains more 
80. The law does permit owners of a majority of a corporation's shares to extract 
any "control premium" that exists. See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson, Holdings 397 N.E.2d 
387, 388 (N.Y. 1979) ("it has long been settled law that, absent looting of corporate 
assets, conversion of a corporate opportunity, fraud or other acts of bad faith, a con-
trolling stockholder is free to sell, and a purchaser is free to buy, that controlling 
interest at a premium price"). 
81. See supra part II.B. 
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widely, are offset by the wasteful development induced by free 
takings insurance. This is a difficult empirical question. 
The remainder of this paper focuses on how best to minimize 
development that subsequent takings turn to waste. To the 
extent that the no-compensation result overestimates waste due 
to takings insurance, it becomes more likely that the gains from 
just compensation exceed its costs. Based on further constitu-
tional manifestations of risk aversion, the next part of this 
paper dissects the vision of government at the foundation of the 
no-compensation theory. 
1. Angelic Decisionmakers? 
The no-compensation result contains an embedded assump-
tion that government is Pigovian, 82 however, the literature has 
not adequately examined this premise. The following argument 
clarifies this assumption, presenting it in the best possible 
light. Even under this sympathetic reading, the assumption is 
both pragmatically and theoretically implausible. 
The Pigovian assumption posits that the government acts 
competently and in the public interest. If the government 
weighs all the costs and benefits of projects, including risk, 
with an eye only to the public good, we can make sense of the 
analogy between risks from takings and other types of risk 
such as lightning. When government is a truly objective and 
rigorous cost-benefit machine, it will choose only projects that 
benefit society at the margin. What determines the marginal 
costs and benefits of new projects that arise? Technology and 
the supply of factors of production drive costs, while consumer 
preferences determine benefits. If technology, supply of factors 
of production, and consumer preferences evolve unpredictably, 
then so too will the set of projects that they make worth-
while.83 
82. The use of the term Pigovian, in honor of the economist A.C. Pigou, is due to 
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Pigou may not 
have held this view of government, however. Victor Goldberg, Pigou on Complex Con· 
tracts and Welfare Economics, 3 REs. L. & ECON. 39 (1981). It is ironic, and perhaps 
just, that Cease in turn might reject the Coasean label. See infra note 98. 
83. See generally NICHOLSON, supra note 17. 
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This is the only way to justify the bald assertion that "losses 
incurred by individuals whose property is taken should be re-
garded as analogous to those that occur through such unsys-
tematic and noncompensable events as market forces or natural 
events. "84 Kaplow makes the same point: 
With fire insurance or market risks, one expects to be self· 
reliant in securing protection; when the risk is directly 
linked to the government, one is more inclined to look to 
the government for protection. But this distinction does not 
indicate what different values, if any, are implicated by the 
origin of unequal burdens, or that any such difference in 
values would call for a governmental response that diverges 
from what investors would find worthwhile when respond-
ing to market risks. 85 
Analogizing the government takings to other risks, however, 
ignores the government's control over the aggregate level of 
takings and the ability of the government to reduce risk by 
judiciously releasing information. Parts V and VI explore these 
issues. Simply put, Kaplow never asks how the government, 
along with landowners, might reduce the risks and other costs 
of takings. 
Nobody really believes that government operates as a perfect 
cost-benefit machine. While the Pigovian assumption does pro-
vide a useful baseline for modeling in other contexts, it is inap-
propriate in the takings context. The Pigovian assumption ren-
ders all interesting questions moot. Laws need not provide 
incentives for a Pigovian government to act more efficiently, 
since by hypothesis goveri:unent acts purely in the public inter-
est. Once we relax the Pigovian assumption, we see how criti-
cally the no-compensation result depends on it. 
2. Sources of Non-Pigovianism 
For many students of history and current affairs, the idea 
that government is not a perfect servant of the populace re-
quires no elaboration. There are, however, different reasons 
84. Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 285. 
85. Kaplow, supra note 37, at 578 (citations omitted). 
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that the government might fail to meet this ideal. A large body 
of literature focuses on the ability of majorities to exploit mi-
norities via eminent domain. 86 Michelman, in a seminal article, 
casts this theory in terms of the "demoralization" costs condem-
nations impose on vulnerable minorities. 87 Fischel and Shapiro 
recast Michelman's argument to refute the no-compensation 
thesis.88 
While these are real concerns, this article focuses on a more 
general problem. The government is the agent of the People; 
however, the People face all sorts of costs in making sure that 
public agents act in the public's interest. While it is commonly 
believed that the Bill of Rights protects individuals and minori-
ties, recent scholarship persuasively argues that the original 
motivation behind the first ten amendments has been over-
looked. 89 According to Professor Amar, 
[t]he conventional understanding of the Bill [of Rights] 
seems to focus almost exclusively on ... protection of mi-
nority against majority while ignoring . . . protection of the 
people against self-interested government. Yet as I shall 
show, [the latter] issue was indeed first in ihe minds of 
those who framed the Bill of Rights. To borrow from the 
language of economics, the Bill of Rights was centrally 
concerned with controlling the "agency costs" created by the 
specialization of labor inherent in a republican govern-
86. In the context of zoning decisions, made by paradigmatically majoritarian local 
governments, these worries may be most justified. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban 
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 404-20 (1977). 
87. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of «Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967). Demoral-
ization costs result when the state could easily compensate for losses but does not. 
Note that, in a no-compensation world, demoralization costs make sense only if the 
government focused condemnations on identifiable minorities. Random condemnations 
made in connection with socially desirable projects make everybody better off on aver-
age and thus cannot demoralize. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
88. Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 14. For a narrower and more technical demon-
stration that parties fearing future majoritarian abuses would require just compensa-
tion for property taken, see William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional 
Choice Model of Compensation for Takings, 9 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 115, 116 (1989) 
("compensation would be the rule chosen if the constitution framers anticipate that 
government will act in a 'majoritarian' fashion, in which the welfare of a minority of 
the population is ignored"). 
89. Amar, supra note 59. 
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ment .... The essence of the Bill of Rights was more struc-
tural than not, and more majoritarian than counter.90 
For our purposes, the important point is that the Bill of 
Rights and the original Constitution evince not a scintilla of 
faith in the benign nature of government. By dividing powers 
between branches, leaving substantial powers with the states, 
requiring frequent elections and the like, the Constitution as-
siduously avoided the risk of concentrating power based on a 
thorough mistrust of government. "Ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition. "91 
Amar has demonstrated that the same distrust of government 
prompted the first Congress to propose the Bill of Rights, in-
cluding the Takings Clause. This distrust included not only the 
traditional agency problem of self-serving acts, but also the 
worry that government agents would be out of touch with the 
populace (e.g., that they would have no incentives to gauge the 
public's level of risk aversion). In the language of agency law, 
the Constitution aimed to enforce legislators' fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care. 
Thus the Bill of Rights does not exhaust the theme of risk 
aversion in the Constitution. It is arguably a central motivation 
for the major structural provisions of the rest of the document, 
separation of powers and federalism. By horizontally and verti-
cally dividing power, the Constitution sacrifices the potential ef-
ficiency of a unitary, hierarchical government because of the 
risk that a single leader or a unified cabal might not act in the 
public interest. 
The idea that unitary rulers offer both the best and worst 
forms of governments dates back to Plato. 92 When strong cen-
tral leadership is indispensable, such as in wartime, democra-
cies have the ability to elect strong leaders. When conditions 
return to normal, such leaders may be unseated. The Constitu-
tion has enough flexibility to defer to the President.93 How-
90. Id. at 1133 (parenthesis omitted). 
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
92. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 213-40 (G.M.A. Grube, trans. 1992). 
93. Two examples illustrate this flexibility. President Lincoln flagrantly violated 
the Constitution when he suspended habeas corpus during the Civil War. EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, THE PREsiDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 227-42 (1957). President 
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ever, each branch of the federal government94 and the states95 
jealously guard their own turf. Incessant political squabbling 
undoubtedly imposes costs in implementing policy, but aversion 
to the risks of centralized power justify these "premiums." 
Without discussing the complex issue of the nature of govern-
ment in detail, one thing seems clear; the Constitution itself 
creates a strong legal presumption that government is not 
Pigovian. 96 Fears of both disloyal and careless government ser-
vants mean that the state must also receive incentives to act in 
the public interest. 
IV. TAKINGS ACCIDENTS 
A. The Basic Idea 
If we assumed that all parties act in the public interest and 
always take every reasonable precaution, no need would exist 
for tort law or the creation of legal incentives for least cost 
avoiders since, by presumption, people would already take all 
efficient precautions. Less drastically, we sometimes do implicit-
ly assume that one class of actors always takes reasonable 
steps to avoid accidents and impose strict liability on the other 
party for any accidents. While tort law does make limited use 
of strict liability, the more widespread use of a bilateral negli-
Roosevelt, with the approval of the Supreme Court, relocated and detained thousands 
of Japanese Americans. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1943) ("when 
under conditions of modem warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the 
power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger"). 
94. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (president unsuccess-
fully attempting to assert broad immunity from congressional investigatory demands); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (judiciary establishing its role as 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution). 
95. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (federal government may 
not "commandeer" state employees to implement its own programs). 
96. For empirical evidence that the government is not Pigovian in the exercise of 
its eminent domain power, see Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, Governmental 
Behavior in Response to Compensation Requirements, 11 J. PuB. ECON. 47 (1979). 
Their empirical findings show that "compensation requirements induced a shift; in 
federal-aid highway construction toward states in which compensation outlays were 
relatively low." Id. at 57. That is, when Congress forced agencies to internalize indi-
rect costs of condemnations (such as relocation expenses), the agencies changed their 
choice of projects. A Pigovian government effectively internalizes all costs in selecting 
projects and would not change its behavior in response to such legislation. 
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gence standard is simply a recognition that it is efficient to pro-
vide both parties to potential accidents with incentives to seek 
low-cost, preventive measures. 
Kaplow cogently summarizes the no-compensation position 
within this tort law analogy: 
Generally, in order to ensure appropriate incentives, it is 
necessary to evaluate the behavior of one of the parties and 
leave the residual cost, in the event of appropriate care by 
the monitored party, on the other party (unless that party's 
behavior is also to be evaluated). Under such a method, a 
negligence rule would monitor the government, and strict 
liability with contributory negligence would monitor the pri-
vate investor. Uf government is Pigovian], the government's 
behavior will presumably be appropriate, so placing liability 
(which, in this context, amounts to allowing costs to be 
imposed) on the private investors would always create cor-
rect ineentives.97 
Other scholars have made the same point arguing that if the 
government is Pigovian, it will behave efficiently by definition 
and no need would exist for incentives. 98 
The no-compensation literature has recognized that private 
citizens fail to act in the public interest, but have been blind to 
the same problem with the government. The constitutional 
presumption that the government is non-Pigovian lies at the 
heart of the Takings Clause. The Pigovian view of government 
ignores the very half of the problem on which the Constitution 
focuses. 
Kaplow and others are correct to hold that efficiency de-
mands landowners to factor in takings risk like any other form 
of exogenous risk.99 This, however, is no reason to ignore in-
centives necessary to induce efficient government behavior. 
When making overall takings policy, efficiency requires atten-
tion to incentives that improve the behavior of a non-Pigovian 
government. The law can deter violations of government agents' 
97. Kaplow, supra note 37, at 569-70 n.174. 
98. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Pre-
caution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1, 38 (1985). 
99. The courts have been sensitive to socially inefficient development in the shad-
ow of likely takings. See infra part VI. 
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duty of care and their duty of loyalty. The no-compensation 
theory aims only to influence private landowners. Kaplow's 
contention, that "[f]or purposes of analyzing risk and incentive 
issues, the source of the uncertainty [government or other 
sources of market risk] is largely irrelevant,"100 makes little 
sense outside the confines of Pigovian fairy tales. 
Once it is clear that eminent domain law must deter both 
landowners and the government in order to maximize gains and 
minimize risks, takings look strikingly like accidents. Two par-
ties interact in ways not foreseeable far in advance and impose 
costs on each other. This in turn suggests that tort theory of-
fers the proper tools to achieve efficient results. 
If bargaining costs between landowners and the government 
were inexpensive, the Coase Theorem101 indicates that we 
could rely on the parties themselves to find the least cost avoid-
er of takings accidents. The allocation of costs would depend on 
the legal regime in place. If the law adopted the no-compensa-
tion rule, but the government was able to avoid some takings 
accidents without substantial cost, we would expect private 
landowners to make side-payments to the government to avert 
surprises. Individual landowners could pay the government to 
provide information on the likelihood that their plots would be 
taken in the near future before deciding whether to develop. 
Landowners as a group could pay the government to limit ag-
gregate takings to reflect their level of risk aversion. 
On the other hand, if property owners had absolute property 
rights (instead of ownership under a liability rule), the govern-
ment would pay landowners to avoid developing land the gov-
ernment would like to buy. There would be no such thing as 
aggregate takings risk under an absolute property rule. 
It seems unlikely, however, that the Coase Theorem applies 
to takings accidents. Transaction costs for purchases of a 
unique asset like land are nontrivial. In a non-Coasean world, 
efficiency requires both parties to take precautions until the 
marginal cost of further avoidance exceeds marginal bene-
100. Kaplow, supra note 37, at 534. 
101. Coase, supra note 82. This article adopts the standard misuse of "Coasean" as 
a synonym for myriad low transaction costs. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for 
Coase and Against "Coaseanism," 99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989). 
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fits.102 Tort law can reach this result by negligence standards 
that hold both parties potentially accountable for accidents. 
In takings law, this implies that the courts must look at 
takings accidents on a case-by-case basis. When landowners 
develop unwisely, in the face of well-publicized risks of govern-
ment projects, a strong argument arises that they have proceed-
ed negligently and should not be compensated. This is akin to a 
fire insurance policy that does not cover unduly risky acts un-
dertaken consciously by the insured. On the other hand, when 
the government fails to release information about a possible 
taking until very late in the process and a landowner develops 
his property, the government's negligent failure to provide no-
tice should make it liable for the cost of the improvements. 
Traditional doctrine holds that the cost of acquiring the prop-
erty provides the optimal deterrent to government takings.103 
But costs increase only if we assume that the courts will in 
effect penalize the government for failing to release information 
in a timely fashion in a takings context. If we erased the Tak-
ings Clause and instead opted for private takings insurance, no 
increased costs would be necessary to induce the government to 
publicize potential condemnations and warn off prospective 
developers. 
Kaplow attempts to distinguish takings (and other govern-
ment transitions) from accidents as follows: 
Calabresi analyzes accidents, an area in which externalities 
are a crucial factor in the incentives analysis. In the con-
text of uncertainty with regard to future government policy, 
externalities do not present any special problems except 
when they are created by government transitional relief. 
Therefore, if one prefers the market approach generally, 
there is not a priori reason for the government to mitigate 
transitions.104 
102. This principle has aptly been labelled "double responsibility at the margin." 
Cooter, supra note 98, at 27-29. 
103. "The simplest economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation 
is that it prevents the government from overusing the taking power." POSNER, supra 
note 12, at 58. 
104. Kaplow, supra note 37, at 563. 
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It is not at all clear what Kaplow means by "externalities," or 
why they are relevant. If the Coase Theorem applies, then 
defining the costs that should be internalized by each actor has 
only distributional, not general efficiency, ramifications. And if 
the Coase Theorem does not apply, then the law should seek to 
impose costs on the least cost avoider to create socially efficient 
incentives. 
Given our assumed inapplicability of the Coase Theorem, 
takings law should create incentives for both government and 
landowners that minimize the net cost of takings accidents. The 
government's informational advantage in eminent domain 
means that it is especially important that the law create incen~ 
tives for efficient use of this information. Private takings insur~ 
ance would create no such incentives and thus makes little 
economic sense. 
B. Government Choice of Aggregate Risk Level 
Before examining how the courts (unlike the theorists) have 
attempted to deal with the government's informational advan-
tage in condemnations, this section briefly addresses a larger 
policy issue. The government determines the total amount of 
risk from takings. It could purchase all property via convention-
al market transactions, abstaining from its eminent domain 
powers. This would eliminate all takings risk. The more the 
government uses its eminent domain power, the more takings 
risk it injects into the economy. 
Moreover, as Blume and Rubinfeld observed in a slightly 
different context, takings risk is not generally diversifiable.105 
105. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 14, at 616. In discussing the risk of zoning 
changes, they state: 
I d. 
[T]he risks associated with the government action cannot be shifted com-
pletely to risk-neutral parties. Unlike an insurance policy for whole life 
coverage on a large group of unrelated individuals, the risk of zoning 
changes is not easily spread among the population. Rather, adverse zon-
ing decision are likely to affect a large number of landowners within the 
jurisdiction. Thus, the risks of loss borne by the landowners are not 
independent of each other, and diversification is no longer possible. 
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In this sense, increased risk produced by more frequent govern-
ment action is like an adverse increase in the rate of a natural 
disaster. Society cannot diversify away the costs of a ten per-
cent increase in lightning strikes. Everyone must pay higher 
insurance rates. 
Unlike lightning, however, takings have benefits as well as 
costs. It is likely that some amount of taking is desirable. The 
optimal societal level of takings must account for the 
population's risk aversion. This optional level does not include 
every project where the dollar benefits exceed the costs exclud-
ing the incremental risk it introduces. This is easy to see if 
potential projects were ordered by their net benefits, excluding 
risk. The first projects presumably offer enormous benefits, so 
even though they entail greater risk, these projects offer a posi-
tive return after accounting for risk. In contrast, projects that 
offer only marginal net benefits are not economical because 
they introduce takings risk, which is an additional cost.106 The 
next two sections explore, respectively, the theory and practice 
of creating legal rules that encourage both efficient development 
by landowners and efficient condemnation by the government. 
V. INFORMATION 
A. The Government's Information Advantage 
Information about risks is essential for avoiding acci-
dents, 107 and the government possesses by far the best infor-
106. Carol Rose suggests that, aside from introducing risk, excessive condemnation 
reduces societal wealth by creating a disincentive to work: 
Continuous property transfers, though they may all eventually even out, 
will not encourage wealth production. In John Locke's language, "industri-
ous and rational" persons cannot get a foothold if legislatures transfer 
their property rights, and force them to pool their labors with the 
"quarrelsom(e] and contentious." Hence pure transfers should be re-
strained in the political market, not because they may go uncompensated 
over the long run, but because they cause too much turmoil for wealth 
producing enterprise. 
Rose, supra note 64, at 586-87. 
107. Some commentators have theorized that information gathering, along with risk 
aversion, is a primary reason for the existence of insurance. See Goran Skogh, The 
Transaction Cost Theory of Insurance: Contracting Impediments and Cost, 56 J. RisK 
& INS. 726 (1989). Skogh points out that large, diversified corporations, with diversi-
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mation on the probability of takings. Large projects usually 
begin on government planners' or engineers' desks. Maps with 
proposed routes circulate through state agencies until the vari-
ous players decide on a final plan. Throughout this process, the 
government controls the amount of information available to the 
general public. 
However, the government's possession of information appar-
ently is not so obvious, since it has continued unnoticed. Blume 
and Rubinfeld noted that "individuals are likely to have more 
information about their own ability to affect the regulation of 
land than would an insurance company."108 They claimed that 
this created an adverse selection problem.109 According to 
Blume and Rubinfeld, "[i]ndividuals with more accurate infor-
mation than the insurance company will be gambling with an 
advantage . . . . "110 Although they conclude that this advan-
tage will cause the private market for takings insurance to fail 
(and advocate government compensation), Blume and Rubinfeld 
never mention the state's undisputed informational advantage 
and its implications for efficiency in takings law. 
Cooter suggests that the fundamental tension in takings law 
is that the government spreads risks better, but individual 
landowners know more about their own development plans.m 
Cooter seems to imply that every development project poses a 
risk to the government's condemnation power.112 However,, this 
implication cannot be correct, given the relative frequency of 
the two events. For instance, every barn constructed does not 
pose a risk to the ability of lightning to strike freely; therefore, 
we continue to insure against the risk of lightning. More 
generally, when two events together cause a loss, one of them 
frequent and the other relatively rare, the rare event is 
classified as a risk to the frequent, and not vice versa. Cooter's 
fied shareholders and diversified tort risk, do not need to join others to spread risk. 
They nonetheless buy insurance because premium schedules and the like provide 
information on avoidance costs. Insurance companies are in the best position to ac· 
quire and disseminate this information. 
108. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 14, at 594. 
109. Id. at 595. 
110. Id. at 596. 
111. See Cooter, supra note 98, at 38-40. 
112. Id. 
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theory is a contorted way of ignoring the risks posed by gov-
ernment condemnations. 
In discussing moral hazard and arguing that the market 
generally balances risks and avoidance incentives more effi-
ciently, Kaplow hypothesizes that "[i]f the government has bet-
ter information concerning the future than private markets do, 
there might be potential for improvement through government 
action."113 However, Kaplow never contemplates the impor-
tance of the government's virtual monopoly on information 
concerning the likelihood of takings. He does note that the 
government might be the most efficient information gatherer, 
but he simply observes that this information could be used 
most efficiently by releasing it to private insurers (i.e. making 
the information public).114 
B. Information in the No-Compensation World 
The no-compensation result thus implies a very simple strate-
gy for exploiting its informational advantage: the government 
should release all details about possible takings immediately. 
Kaplow summarizes the logic behind this inference: 
Simply put, government compensation creates an externality 
that otherwise would not be present. Compensation shifts 
part of the long-run cost of private investment to the gov-
ernment and thus distorts an otherwise efficient 
decisionmaking process. It is socially desirable for investors 
to take into account the prospects for government reform; 
compensation eliminates this incentive by insulating inves-
tors from an important element of downside risk.115 
It is impossible for landowners and developers to "take into 
account the prospects for government reform" without all rele-
vant information. Beyond requiring the government to announce 
condemnations as early as possible, efficiency in a no-compensa-
tion world demands that the government release tentative plans 
113. Kaplow, supra note 37, at 541-42 n.90. Kaplow further claims the "general 
implausibility of this informational assumption," but cites only his own unpublished 
manuscript as documentation. Id. 
114. Id. at 545 n.98. 
115. Id. at 531 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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and revisions that affect the probability that it will eventually 
condemn property.116 
Early release of information helps in two ways. First, it en-
ables landowners to avoid wasteful development. In demonstrat-
ing that free takings insurance is, in effect, an externality that 
induces wasteful development, Kaplow directly implies that the 
government should release information because of the "desir-
ability of exposing investors to the full costs and benefits of 
their decisions. "117 
Suppose there is a substantial chance that land will be 
taken and leveled for a highway .... Should [this event] 
occur, investments in improvements on the land ... would 
be rendered worthless. Accordingly, ex post, it might well 
have been socially preferable for the landowner and the 
manufacturer not to have made the investments in the first 
place. The opposite preference would exist if the events 
were not to occur. As a result, it is just as socially desirable 
for the landowner . . . to take both possibilities into account 
ex ante .... 118 
"To take both possibilities into account ex ante" means to esti-
mate the probability that the government will take the proper-
ty. Landowners can only accurately assess this probability with 
information about government plans. 
A second way in which releasing information early helps 
landowners is that it naturally divides properties into risk cate-
gories. Private insurance on plots the government will almost 
certainly conde:nui. would be prohibitively expensive, while pre-
miums would be relatively inexpensive on land the government 
expresses absolutely no interest in using. This would, in turn, 
enable private citizens to allocate risks among themselves more 
efficiently. Speculators could provide a market for risk-averse 
owners to sell property the state is likely to condemn. In turn, 
the speculators could invest in property with only a small prob-
ability of being condemned. Just as information on the riskiness 
116. "The issue of whether a specific change can be anticipated is a matter of 
degree • • • • Perceptive investors will typically act on probability estimates of possi-
ble changes . . . ." Id. at 525-26. 
117. Id. at 529. 
118. Id. at 529 (citations omitted). 
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of other assets is essential for investors developing investment 
portfolios that match their personal risk/reward tradeoffs, infor-
mation on the riskiness of land helps owners choose properlies 
with which they are most comfortable.119 
C. Problems with Releasing Information and Why Private 
Insurance Will Not Work 
As case law shows, releasing information on the odds of po-
tential takings creates a problem that is easy to overlook from 
the perch of high theory. The timing of information releases 
and their effect on compensation raise various problems. For 
example, knowledge that the government may condemn proper-
ty will inhibit potential buyers from purchasing property and 
owners from developing property.120 The longer that land re-
mains under a "cloud of condemnation," the greater the mone-
tary loss to the owner. In addition, releasing every gyration in 
government plans might increase volatility in land prices since 
prices generally reflect the government's latest forecast of fu-
ture condemnation possibilities. These costs may outweigh the 
benefits from the early release of information. Paradoxically, 
information on potential takings is not always a good thing. A 
Pigovian government always correctly weighs these factors by 
definition, but a negligent or corrupt government generally does 
not. 
Private takings insurance would not alleviate any of these 
complications. For example, any attempt to insure against the 
cloud of condemnation, in addition to condemnation itself, faces 
grave definitional problems. For purposes of an insurance con-
tract, one can foresee a number of lawsuits to determine wheth-
er a government announcement diminished the value of insured 
property, or whether other factors account for the price decline. 
119. For a modem treatment of portfolio theory (the tradeoff between risk and 
return), see E.J. ELTON & M.J. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVEST-
MENT ANALYSIS (1984). 
120. See infra part VI (exploring this and other problems in determining compen-
sation when there is a significant gap between the time information about a possible 
taking becomes likely and the time the government formally begins condemnation 
proceedings). 
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Moreover, private insurance raises additional difficulties inap-
plicable to government compensation. First, if landowners pay 
annual premiums, they would be subject to rising and perhaps 
prohibitive insurance bills if a taking appeared imminent. In a 
worst-case example, the insurer might refuse to renew a policy 
the day before the government condemned the property. 
Even assuming that private takings contracts permit land-
owners to get around this problem by locking in coverage for a 
long-term fixed premium, there is yet another problem·. In a 
private insurance world, an increased likelihood of a taking 
makes the sale of property more difficult. New owners would 
face prohibitive premiums, if they can obtain insurance at all. 
This makes the cloud of condemnation worse than when the 
government pays just compensation because purchasers risk 
losing everything, not just further erosion in the market price 
of the property. 
Private insurance could conceivably get around this problem 
by making policies "run with the land." Private takings insur-
ance, once purchased, would survive changes in ownership and 
protect subsequent buyers of the property. Combining this type 
of private insurance with a long-term, fixed premium, however, 
seems to remove most of the distinctions between private insur-
ance and public just compensation. Under such a system of 
private insurance, premiums would bear no relation to the 
current chance of a taking. The value of this dated insurance 
policy would become capitalized into the price of properties, 
trivializing the role of the private market in most transactions. 
Also, it seems likely that transaction costs would be much 
higher in a world of private takings insurance. Under present 
law, society does not incur any contracting costs under the 
Takings Clause. While in some cases there are significant costs 
in litigating the true measure of "just compensation," there is 
no reason to believe that private insurers can avoid such suits. 
Homeowners will want to insure the market value of their 
homes, not the purchase price, and private insurers have all 
the same incentives as the government to contest the amount 
they pay out. 
For these reasons, private takings insurance either fails when 
it is most needed or differs little from public compensation. The 
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nature of governmental releases of information makes it 
difficult to structure an insurance contract that would protect 
landowners. 
Moreover, private insurance ignores a fundamental tension in 
takings policy. On the one hand, releasing information as soon 
as it becomes available minimizes wasteful development and 
helps categorize the risks in properties. This is the end of the 
story for the no-compensation theorists. On the other hand, this 
same information may cause needless variations in land prices 
and inhibit the liquidity of land by placing a cloud of condem-
nation over many properties that ultimately will not be con-
demned. The optimum amount of information to release in each 
case depends on the relative size of the benefits versus the cost 
in additional risk to landowners. 
Private takings insurance removes any need for the govern-
ment to consider these issues. The government has few concrete 
incentives to worry about either late or early release of infor-
mation. It does not have to pay for development that turns out 
to have been wasteful, and it does not have to litigate issues 
surrounding the cloud of condemnation. With private insurance, 
the party with an overwhelming informational advantage has 
no incentive or legal requirements to weigh the costs and bene-
fits of releasing information on possible takings. The next sec-
tion explores legal doctrines that have aimed to structure prop-
er incentives for government (and landowner) behavior. 
VI. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO TAKINGS ACCIDENTS 
Extended delays between the first publicity about a possible 
taking and the final decision to condemn or not to condemn 
create two types of takings accidents. When the state proceeds 
with a taking and the landowner subsequently develops the 
property after the initial publicity, the courts must decide 
whether just compensation includes the value of the improve-
ments. When the state abandons a project and declines to take 
land it previously expressed interest in, the courts must decide 
whether landowners can recover for lost income during the 
period of uncertainty. 
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In either case the no-compensation result dictates that land-
owners bear the cost; but we have shown that this ignores the 
need to provide the government with incentives to act efficient-
ly. This section examines how courts and legislatures, sharing 
the Constitution's skeptical view of government, have created 
incentives for the government, as well as landowners, to avoid 
these takings accidents. Just as in tort law, the courts have 
appealed to "reasonable" behavior by both parties across a wide 
range of takings accidents. 
A. Right of Way Reservations 
A number of state legislatures have enacted statutes purport-
ing to give government officials wide power to reserve land for 
future condemnation.121 The point of these laws is to discour-
age development in places the government may need in the 
future. The key provision in these laws is the denial of compen-
sation for any improvements made after the state files the 
proper papers to reserve a site. 
These statutes simply create a no-compensation regime. For 
example, if the government applied these statutes to every plot 
of land in a state, it would effectively result in a no-compensa-
tion world. The courts, however, have objected to even limited 
use of these statutes. While usually not found facially uncon-
stitutional, the statutes have been struck down as applied in 
most cases. "The few . . . that have been held not to constitute 
a taking (1) limit the duration of the reservation and (2) allow 
the owner an opportunity to develop the mapped lands by ob-
taining a variance."122 
In distinguishing between acceptable and objectionable reser-
vations, the courts have applied a reasonableness standard. "At 
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 337.241(2) (Harrison 1991) (held unconstitutional 
in Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990)); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 462.359 (West 1991) (viewed as unconstitutional in Op. Atty. Gen. 59-A (July 
27, 1944)). The most stringent provisions permit the state to bar all development for 
an unlimited period. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, 1 4-510 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KY. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 100.239 (MichieJBobbs-Merrill 1993); 36 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 670-206 to 
670-208 (1961 & Supp. 1992). 
122. 8A NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 17.03[1][a] (J. Sackman rev. 3d 
ed. 1990) [hereinafter NICHOLS]. 
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present, most of the courts which have confronted the issue 
have held that right-of-way reservations are an improper use of 
the police power if they do not allow the landowner a reason-
able and economically viable use of his property after it is re-
served. "123 In other words, the courts will not permit the legis-
lature to use reservations to make an end run around the Tak-
' ings Clause. Such statutes cannot create a presumption that 
the landowner, as opposed to the government, acted unreason-
ably and caused a takings accident by developing property the 
government expresses some inchoate interest in acquiring. The 
value to society of at least some development may exceed the 
risk that an eventual taking will lay waste to the 
improvements. 
B. Cloud of Condemnation 
Reservations, along with a host of other forms of publicity, 
put the world on notice that the government may (sooner or 
later) condemn a piece of land. This practice places the property 
under a cloud of condemnation, discouraging development and 
inhibiting sales.124 Even if the government eventually pays 
fair market value for the plot, landowners often sue to recover 
income foregone during the period between the first hint of 
interest and the official date of condemnation. As discussed in 
the previous paragraph, to the extent that private losses exceed 
public gains, the courts should support recovery to deter the 
government from inefficiently clouding the use of property. The 
courts' "reasonableness" standard aims to draw this line. 
Early decisions cast the issue in terms of justice: 
It would be highly unjust to deprive an owner of the right 
to make the best use of his property except at his peril 
merely because it lies in the path of one of the many public 
improvements which are so often discussed and projected 
without being actually consummated for many years.125 
123. Id. § 17.01 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
124. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
125. 2 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 5.45[1] (J. Sackman ed. rev. 3d 
ed. 1994), citing Higgins v. Dublin, 28 I.L.R. 484 (Ireland 1891). 
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More recent decisions, however, explicitly invoke reasonable-
ness: 
Property owners who are aware of proposed condemnations 
nevertheless may make reasonable improvements to their 
property and are entitled to the value of the improvements 
made with such knowledge before the taking. . . . On the 
other hand, the property owner is not entitled to the value 
of improvements made solely in bad faith for the purpose of 
enhancing an award.126 
The cases clearly indicate that courts scrutinize government 
behavior for gradations of fault and draw on concepts of tort 
law such as proximate cause: 
We perceive in eminent domain cases-or 'just compensa-
tion" cases-various degrees of culpability on the part of the 
public entity which entitle condemnees to an escalating 
amount of relief, depending upon the determination of that 
degree. Unusually oppressive conduct results in a determi-
nation of "de facto taking" while delay is answerable in 
proximately caused damages. What constitutes oppression, 
or direct and substantial impairment of property rights by 
the condemnor, is essentially a factual question, one deter-
minable on a case-by-case basis. 127 
As in tort law, establishing standards for reasonableness and 
proximate cause is not always easy. In People u. Peninsula 
Enterprises, 128 for example, the court stated: 
[A] property owner's ability to collect damages . . . for un-
reasonable precondemnation delay depends upon whether 
the conduct of the public agency in question has evolved to 
the point where its announcements result in a special and 
direct interference with the owner's property; the wide-
spread impact resulting from mere general planning is non-
compensable.129 
126. Babinec v. State, 512 P.2d 563, 572 (Alaska 1973) (emphasis added). For a 
similar standard, see State ex rel. Herman v. Schaffer, 515 P.2d 593 (Ariz. 1973). 
127. Los Angeles v. Waller, 90 Cal. App. 3d 766, 778 (1979). 
128. 91 Cal. App. 3d 332 (1979). 
129. Id. at 355. 
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The difference between (compensable) "special and direct inter-
ference" and "mere general planning" sounds like the fuzzy 
standards used to distinguish regulations from takings. The 
important point, however, is that the courts realize that takings 
law must provide incentives for the government to behave effi-
ciently. 
The seminal "cloud of condemnation" case for precondemna-
tion delay damages is Klopping v. City of Whittier.130 In 
Klopping, the city dropped condemnation proceedings against 
land targeted for a parking lot in the face of a lawsuit, but 
officially declared its intention to proceed if and when it won 
the legal battle.131 After the lawsuit dragged on for two years, 
targeted property owners brought suit for inverse condemnation 
and for damages due to the extended failure to take after the 
city announced its plans.132 
Although the court rejected the inverse condemnation claim, 
it held that the government could be liable for precondemnation 
delay damages. It laid down a reasonableness standard for 
government behavior. "When the condemnor acts unreasonably 
in issuing precondemnation statements, either by excessively 
delaying eminent domain action or by other oppressive conduct, 
our constitutional concern over property rights requires that the 
owner be compensated."133 The court noted, however, that the 
benefits of early publicity must be weighed against its costs. 
"To allow recovery in every instance in which a public auth01ity 
announces its intention to condemn some unspecified portion of 
a larger area in which an individual's land is located would be 
to severely hamper long-range planning by such authori-
ties .... "134 
Courts in many other jurisdictions have followed Klopping's 
approach. Although the court in Littman v. Gimello135 refused 
to compensate a landowner because the state included his prop-
130. 500 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1972). 
131. Id. at 1348. 
132. Id. at 1348-49. 
133. ld. at 1355. 
134. Id. at 1350 n.1. 
135. 557 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1989). 
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erty in a list of potential waste sites, it declared that "[s]everal 
factors must be considered and balanced in deciding whether a 
compensable-taking claim flowing from precondemnation activity 
has been established. First and foremost, extraordinary delay or 
other unreasonable conduct on the part of the condemning au-
thority may give rise to a taking claim. "136 
VII. CONCLUSION 
When risk-averse landowners adopt eminent domain as a 
way of spreading the costs and benefits of worthwhile public 
projects, the analogy of just compensation to takings insurance 
is intuitive and clear. The Constitution, replete with explicit 
and implicit appeals to risk aversion, strongly supports this 
construction of the Takings Clause. The no-compensation theo-
ry, however, has presented a skewed picture of takings insur-
ance by adopting the Pigovian assumption and ignoring the 
incentives necessary to insure efficient behavior by government 
as well as landowners. Critics of the no-compensation result 
have focused too narrowly on majoritarian threats. General 
problems with controlling the People's governing agents better 
explain the need for balanced compensation law that provides 
both the state and constituent landowners with incentives to 
avoid wasteful development. When such waste does occur, it is 
often the fault of one party or the other, and in many ways 
looks like accidents in tort law. The courts have realized the 
need to look at both sides of the takings equation to minimize 
takings accidents and have developed reasonableness standards 
much akin to the negligence standard of tort law. 
136. ld. at 320·21; see also Standard Indus., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 454 
N.W.2d 417 (Mich. App. 1990) (finding no unreasonable delay since unexpected end to 
federal funding caused cancellation of project); McGaffic v. Redevelopment Auth., 548 
A.2d 653 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (arguing that 12 years between initial interest and 
withdrawal of proposal amounted to a de facto taking, but that 3 year delay might 
not); Roth v. State Highway Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo. App. 1984) (granting 
landowner new trial for "aggravated delay" because state refused to grant building 
permit for over 7 years, with one official telling landowner that "over my dead body 
will you get [a building permit} until you settle with the Highway Department."). 
